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THE YOUNG AND THE
REDEMPTIONLESS? JUVENILE
OFFENDERS BEFORE MILLER V.
ALABAMA
KATHERINE JOHNSON*
ADDENDUM
The Supreme Court’s decision on Montgomery was still pending at
the time of writing. On Monday, January 25th, the Court issued its
decision, holding that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without
parole for juveniles announced a new substantive rule that is
retroactive in cases on state collateral review. The Court largely
articulated the reasoning in the Commentary below, stressing that
Miller rendered life without parole an unconstitutional punishment
for juvenile offenders whose crimes did not reflect irrevocable
depravity. Such rules prohibiting certain punishments for certain
classes of defendants are hallmark substantive rules, which must apply
retroactively under Supreme Court precedent. The Court’s decision
departs somewhat from the Commentary below in its discussion of
remedies. While my Commentary contemplates resentencing as an the
sole appropriate remedy for adults who were sentenced as youths to
life without parole, the Court held that a state may remedy a Miller
violation by extending parole eligibility to those offenders.
INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
1
punishment protects defendants from excessive sanctions. Although
this protection has long stood as central to American jurisprudence,
our understanding of what constitutes cruel and unusual is far from
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017. I would like to thank Lauren Fine
‘11, Co-Founder and Co-Director at the Youth Sentencing & Reentry Project and former
member of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, for her invaluable
assistance.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
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static. Rather, it is dynamic and tracks “the evolving standards of
2
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In recent
years, the Supreme Court has analyzed the Eighth Amendment in the
context of juvenile criminal law. The Court has recognized that
children, much like our “maturing society,” possess capacity for
3
growth and change. Generally speaking, the relative cognitive and
emotional immaturity of children makes juvenile offenders less
culpable for their actions than their adult counterparts. Children are
thus more likely to rehabilitate and desist from unlawful behavior as
4
they age.
Our contemporary understanding of juvenile offenders is radically
5
different from that of the 1970s. Prompted by fear of escalating
juvenile crime rates and media reports of juvenile “super predators,”
state legislatures passed laws that substantially increased the number
6
of youth tried as adults. Consequently, more children received “adult”
sentences, such as life imprisonment without parole and the death
penalty, which stood clearly in opposition to the juvenile system’s
7
emphasis on rehabilitation.
In the new millennium, the Court began to realize that “adult time
8
for adult crime” was a persuasive mantra, but an unconstitutional
approach to juvenile punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Thus,
in 2005, the Court in Roper v. Simmons banned capital punishment for
9
children. Five years later, the Court invalidated life without parole
(LWOP) sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenses in Graham v.
10
Florida. Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the court held that
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles constitute cruel and
11
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Few would dispute that these three decisions reflect a dramatically
different understanding of juvenile sentencing from that of earlier
decades. Courts across the country, however, disagree sharply about
2. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
3. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
4. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
5. See Vincent M. Southerland, Youth Matters: The Need To Treat Children Like
Children, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 765, 766 (2015).
6. Id. at 766.
7. Id. at 779.
8. See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 at 473 (2012).
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
11. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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whether the holding in Miller applies retroactively on collateral
12
review. Many state and federal courts have held that the Court in
Miller fashioned a substantive rule, which must apply on collateral
review to individuals who were sentenced pre-Miller to mandatory
13
LWOP for crimes they committed as juveniles. As a result, these
individuals are now entitled to new sentencing hearings, in which
14
courts will take the mitigating factors of youth into account. Other
courts, however, treat Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP for youths as
15
simply a new procedural rule, not a substantive one. Consequently,
individuals in these jurisdictions who received mandatory LWOP
sentences before Miller are not entitled to the benefit of new
sentencing hearings, even though they are now effectively serving
16
illegal sentences.
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the latter view in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, holding that Miller does not apply
retroactively on collateral review to people sentenced to mandatory
17
LWOP as juveniles. Following Miller, Henry Montgomery petitioned
18
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in September of 2014. The
19
Court granted certiorari in March of 2015. The State of Louisiana is
the respondent.
This commentary begins by detailing the relevant factual
background of Montgomery, including the contemporaneous
development of Supreme Court jurisprudence about juvenile
sentencing. It proceeds by detailing the procedural history of
Louisiana v. Miller as well as the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s
holding in the case below. It then examines the arguments advanced

12. Collateral review is a non-appeal proceeding to attack a judgment. A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack. See Collateral Review, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13. See Brief in Opposition at 14, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280 (U.S. Dec. 1,
2014) (listing federal courts in New York, California, New Jersey, and Minnesota and state
courts in Florida, California, Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming as
applying Miller retroactively).
14. See id.
15. See id. (describing state courts in Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
and Pennsylvania as not applying retroactively, as well as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits).
16. See id.
17. See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264.
18. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280 (U.S. June 22, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
19. The Court granted Montgomery’s petition after Toca v. Louisiana, the case the Court
had initially agreed to review in order to resolve Miller’s retroactivity issue, became moot
because of an actual innocence issue.
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by both parties, concluding that the Court should reverse the
Louisiana decision and resolve the existing split among state and
20
federal courts by holding that Miller applies retroactively.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1963, Henry Montgomery, an African-American teenager, was
arrested for the murder of a white law enforcement officer in
21
Louisiana. Following a jury trial in Baton Rouge, a city permeated
by KKK activity, Montgomery was convicted of murder and
22
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole. As a
result, under Louisiana law, Montgomery would never have the
opportunity to alter or reduce his sentence by demonstrating
23
rehabilitated character during a parole hearing.
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the sentence
Montgomery received is unconstitutional under the Eighth
24
Amendment. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that imposing
mandatory LWOP sentences on juveniles constitutes cruel and
25
unusual punishment. Sentencers must have the ability to consider
“the mitigating qualities of youth,” which a mandatory LWOP
sentence precludes by automatically and irrevocably requiring an
individual to die in prison, regardless of that individual’s level of
26
culpability and capacity for rehabilitation.
Although Miller rendered Montgomery’s sentence unlawful, the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied his motion to correct an illegal
27
sentence. The court declared that Miller created a new procedural
28
rule, not a new substantive rule. Under the Supreme Court’s analysis
29
in the 1989 decision Teague v. Lane, only new substantive rules apply
retroactively. If a new rule is merely procedural, it will not apply
30
retroactively on collateral review. Even though the continued

20. The Court will also determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide this case, but this
commentary will only focus on the retroactivity issue.
21. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 3.
22. See id. at 3–5.
23. See id. at 5–8.
24. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2459.
27. See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264.
28. Id.
29. 489 U.S. 288, 109 (1989).
30. See id.
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implementation of Miller’s sentence constitutes ongoing cruel and
unusual punishment, the Supreme Court of Louisiana believed that
Teague tied its hands from ending the affliction of the
31
unconstitutional penalty against Montgomery. This decision ignored
the fact that evidence strongly suggests that Montgomery “has been
32
rehabilitated” after spending more than fifty years in prison.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Concerning Juveniles
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment
for crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender
33
and the offense.” The concept of cruel and unusual punishment is
34
“not static.” Rather, it must “draw its meaning from the evolving
35
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
As a result, courts conform their analyses to “currently prevail[ing]
standards of whether a punishment is ‘excessive’ or ‘cruel and
36
unusual.’”
Like these standards of decency, scientific research and knowledge
of adolescent development is similarly evolving and deepening. That
knowledge has informed the prevailing standards of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment against juveniles, which has in turn
informed the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Eighth
37
Amendment’s application to juveniles. The Court articulated that
understanding most recently in Miller v. Alabama, when it invalidated
38
a state law requiring LWOP for juveniles convicted of murder. The
Court’s decision in Miller was a logical progression from Graham v.
Florida, which held as unconstitutional LWOP sentences for non39
homicide juvenile offenses. Graham was the first decision in which

31. See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264.
32. Id. at 5 (“Even without hope of release, he has served as a coach and trainer for a
boxing team he helped establish, has worked in the prison’s silkscreen department, and strives
to be a positive role model and counselor for other inmates.”).
33. Id.
34. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
35. Id.
36. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 384 (Iowa 2014).
37. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“Our decisions rested not only on
common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”).
38. Id. at 2475.
39. See id. at 2458.
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the Court imposed a categorical ban on the use of a term of
40
imprisonment. The Court in Miller described LWOP as “akin to the
death penalty” when imposed on a juvenile, given that he will likely
41
spend the vast majority of his life behind bars. The Court in Graham
did not ban LWOP for all juvenile offenders, as it did with capital
punishment in Roper v. Simmons, but it did require that sentencers
reserve it for crimes of homicide, given that it is the law’s second most
42
“severe punishment.”
Together, the Graham, Roper, and Miller decisions reflect the
Court’s view that children are “less deserving of the most severe
punishments” than adults because they are still in the process of
developing the cognitive and emotional maturity expected of law43
abiding adults. In all three cases, the Court cited extensive scientific
research illustrating juveniles’ heightened susceptibility to
psychological damage, peer pressure, “transient rashness, proclivity
44
for risk, and inability to assess consequences.” Furthermore, the
Court found many children were confined to the “family and home
environment that surrounds [them]—and from which [they] cannot
usually extricate [themselves]—no matter how brutal or
45
dysfunctional.” Also, children are often ill-equipped to deal with the
adult criminal justice system, including police officers, which can
46
adversely contribute to their convictions. All of these characteristics
lessen children’s “moral culpability” and indicate that as they
continue to neurologically develop, they will desist in their unlawful
47
behavior without outside intervention. When judges are allowed to
exercise discretion in the juvenile sentencing process, they are able to
fashion a penalty that encourages rehabilitation, as children are “less
fixed” in their behavior than adults and their “actions are less likely to
48
be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”
The Miller Court condemned mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles by stating that:

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id.
Id. at 2466.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010).
Id. at 50.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
Id. at 2468.
Id.
See id. at 2465.
Id. at 2458.
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Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer
from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these
schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every
other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the
accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a
chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile . . . will
receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults
committing similar homicide offenses. So Graham and Roper and
our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats
49
every child as an adult.

The Court stated that this cabining of judicial discretion
contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
disproportionate punishments. As the Court stated, “youth matters for
50
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments.” The
Court pointed out that judges were still allowed to issue a LWOP
sentence to a juvenile defendant only after “tak[ing] into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against
51
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
B. Retroactivity Under Mackey and Teague
While Miller undoubtedly created a new constitutional rule—the
imposition of mandatory LWOP sentence on a juvenile constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment—a new constitutional rule must also
be substantive, and not merely procedural, in order to apply
52
53
retroactively. In other words, the roughly 2,100 individuals serving
mandatory LWOP sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles
will not be entitled to resentencing hearings if the Court holds that
Miller created a procedural rule. If, however, the Court holds that the
Miller rule is substantive, those individuals may be entitled to such
54
hearings. Montgomery’s outcome will therefore have substantive
implications, but those implications have no bearing on the
determination of the Miller rule as substantive or procedural.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 2467.
Id. at 2471.
Id. at 2469.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (May 2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile_Life_
Without_Parole.pdf.
54. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 10.
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Instead, the Court has historically relied on Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in the 1971 decision Mackey v. United States to
55
distinguish substantive rules from procedural rules. Justice Harlan in
Mackey set an exacting standard that a new constitutional rule must
meet before it can be deemed “substantive” and thus apply
56
retroactively. Justice Harlan employed a stringent standard because
he was a strong proponent of preserving the finality of criminal
57
convictions. He believed that “at some point, the criminal process, if
it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man
ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once
58
convicted.” Justice Harlan espoused the traditionally conservative
belief that the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, a tool that
convicted individuals can use to challenge the legality of their
59
convictions, posed a threat to finality in the criminal justice system.
In his view, habeas should be invoked in limited circumstances, such
as when “attack[ing] the constitutionality of the federal . . . or state . . .
60
statute under which [a convicted individual has] been convicted.”
61
Justice Harlan lamented the Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen,
which allowed all constitutional claims to be relitigated on habeas,
and did not want the Court to officially sanction the then-popular
assumption that “habeas courts should apply current constitutional
62
law to habeas petitioners before them.” Doing so would further
widen the floodgates that Brown had already opened:
While men languish in jail . . . awaiting a first trial on their guilt or
innocence, it is not easy to justify expending substantial quantities
of the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal
convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final
continually inquiring into the current constitutional validity of
criminal convictions . . . . No one . . . is benefited by a judgment
providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id.
See id. at 691.
Id.
See id. at 685.
Id. at 684.
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 686.
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and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
63
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”

Justice Harlan further believed that relitigation does not produce
accurate results, as a “state that wishes to continue enforcing its laws
against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the
remote past through presentation of witnesses whose memories of the
64
relevant events often have dimmed.” In his view, the “speculative
effect” that applying a new procedural rule may have on a preexisting
conviction or sentence did not justify undermining the principle of
65
finality in the criminal justice system. Thus, new procedural rules
“merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the
66
invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.”
Justice Harlan did pronounce a crucial caveat to his general
opposition to applying new constitutional rules on collateral review.
He only opposed the retroactive application of new procedural due
process rules, or “those applications of the Constitution that forbid
the Government to utilize certain techniques or processes in
enforcing concededly valid societal proscriptions on individual
67
behavior.” On the other hand, he believed that new “substantive due
process” rules that “placed certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
68
proscribe,” should apply retroactively. For example, Loving v.
69
Virginia invalidated anti-miscegenation laws under the Fourteenth
70
Amendment, while Griswold v. Connecticut struck down a state
71
contraception ban by formulating a constitutional right to privacy.
New substantive due process rules like these complied with his
traditional view of habeas, as “the writ has historically been available
72
for attacking convictions on such grounds.”
Justice Harlan believed that a matter involving a new substantive
due process rule “represents the clearest instance where finality
interests should yield . . . . There is little societal interest in permitting

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 690–91.
Id.
Id.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 345, 352 (2004).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692.
Id.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 n.7.
Id. at 693.
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the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never
73
to repose.” In the words of U.S. Solicitor Donald Verrilli, the creation
of new substantive rules raises “a real risk that a person has been
subjected to an unjustified punishment,” and that risk outweighs
74
society’s interests in finality. Furthermore, applying new substantive
75
rules does not entail the “adverse collateral consequences of retrial.”
The plurality of the Court in Teague v. Lane adopted Justice
76
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Mackey, defining substantive rules as
77
those that forbid punishment of certain primary conduct. The
78
Court’s subsequent decision in Penry v. Lynaugh took the holding in
Teague to its next logical step. Writing for the majority, Justice
O’Connor explained that Teague articulated an erroneously narrow
view of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Mackey: “Although Teague
read this exception as focusing solely on new rules according
constitutional protection to an actor’s primary conduct, Justice Harlan
did speak in terms of substantive categorical guarantees accorded by
79
the Constitution, regardless of the procedures followed.”
As a result, substantive rules that have retroactive force include
“not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment
80
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” For
example, a new rule that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons . . . regardless of the
procedures followed,” would be substantive and therefore apply
81
retroactively. This is because “a new rule placing a certain class of
individuals beyond the State’s power to punish by death is analogous

73. Id.
74. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Montgomery v.
Louisiana, No. 14-280, (U.S. July 29, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae].
75. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Harlan offered one other category of new constitutional rules that should apply
retroactively on collateral review: procedural rules that are “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” Harlan cited Gideon v. Wainwright’s formulation of a rule endowing criminal
defendants with the right to counsel as an example of such a rule. Today, this type of rule is
referred to as a “watershed rule,” but Gideon remains the only decision that the Court has cited
as an example of such a rule. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 19
n.8.
77. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion).
78. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
79. Id. at 329
80. Id. at 330.
81. Id.
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to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to
82
punish at all.” In both instances, the Constitution “deprives the State
of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity
concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity have little
83
force.” A court’s failure to apply a new substantive rule retroactively
poses “a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act
that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the
84
law cannot impose upon him [or her].” The need to correct an unjust
85
sentence trumps any concerns about finality in that instance.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Louisiana’s Argument
The Respondent State of Louisiana argues that Miller v. Alabama
86
created merely a procedural rule, and not a substantive one. After
all, in the Miller court’s own words, its ban on mandatory LWOP for
juveniles did not “categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders
87
or type of crime.” In other words, the Miller court did not impose an
outright ban on LWOP sentences for juveniles. A juvenile homicide
offender therefore could still receive a discretionary LWOP sentence
following Miller. The Miller court merely mandated “that a sentencer
follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
88
attendant characteristics—before imposing” a LWOP penalty.
Essentially, “the defendant’s ‘category of punishment’ is life-withoutparole, and its ‘mandatory’ nature simply reflects the state’s failure to
89
follow ‘a certain process’ before imposing it.” Therefore, according to
Louisiana, Miller was a prototypical procedural holding under Teague
v. Lane and its progeny, because it simply required “a new

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417
U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
85. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“This, I
believe is because it represents the clearest instance where finality interests should yield.”).
86. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 19–20 (“What Miller did was regulate the
procedure for determining the culpability of a juvenile who commits murder . . . .”).
87. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
88. Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 19–20 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2471 (2012)).
89. Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 30 (2015).
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procedure—a penalty phase before a sentence of life without parole is
90
imposed for a crime committed by a juvenile.”
B. Montgomery’s Argument
Petitioner Montgomery and his amici, including the United States
91
and the American Bar Association, argue that Miller created an
92
inherently substantive rule that applies retroactively. Unlike
respondent Louisiana, Montgomery argues that mandatory LWOP
constitutes an entirely separate punishment from discretionary
93
LWOP. Montgomery maintains that since Miller banned the
imposition of mandatory LWOP on a juvenile, he is facing “a
94
punishment that the law cannot impose on him.” Montgomery is, in
effect, wrongfully imprisoned, so Louisiana must cure this
unconstitutional sentence.
Montgomery relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v.
95
United States to support his characterization of mandatory LWOP as
“substantively distinct and harsher than” discretionary life without
96
parole sentences. In Alleyne, the Court stated that “[m]andatory
97
minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” It follows
logically that the “legally prescribed range is the penalty affixed to the
98
crime.” Accordingly, it is “impossible to dissociate the floor of a
sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime,” as
“[e]levating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of
99
liberty associated with the crime.” Stated differently, “substantive
100
rules are those that reshape permissible outcomes.” By invalidating
90. Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at
Mandatory Sentences, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/.
91. See Brief for Am. Bar Ass’n. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, (S. Ct. July 29, 2015); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 8.
92. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 13–15.
93. See id. at 10 (treating discretionary LWOP and mandatory LWOP differently in
discussion).
94. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
95. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 16.
97. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (2013).
98. Id. at 2160.
99. Id. at 2160–61.
100. Brief of the Equal Justice Initiative on Behalf of Dozens Sentenced to Die in Prison
When They Were Children as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 11, Montgomery v.
Louisiana, No. 14-280 (S. Ct. July 29, 2015).
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statutes that resulted in life without parole as the sole permissible
outcome in the sentencing of a juvenile, Montgomery argues that the
101
Miller rule reshaped permissible outcomes. Thus, to Montgomery, a
“mandatory life without parole sentence . . . is substantively different
from [a discretionary life without parole sentence]; it is harsher, more
102
aggravated, and imposes a heightened loss of liberty.”
Montgomery also finds Supreme Court capital punishment
jurisprudence to be supportive of his position that Miller is
substantive. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court struck down a
mandatory death penalty statute, holding that “fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
103
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”
104
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court made a critical
distinction “between the substantive right to individualized
sentencing that is required under the Eighth Amendment and the
specific procedures states adopt in implementing such individualized,”
105
discretionary sentencing schemes. The court said:
There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s
character and record and to circumstances of the offense . . .
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
106
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.

Essentially, while states may utilize different procedures in
deciding which cases merit the death penalty, it is “‘constitutionally
107
indispensable”
and “essential” that sentencers be afforded
108
discretion in their decision-making.

101. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 17 (“Miller requires that juveniles be
afforded an expanded range of sentencing options by prohibiting mandatory life without parole
punishments.”).
102. Id.
103. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976).
104. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 20.
106. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
107. Id. at 601 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
108. Id. at 605.
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Miller relied on Woodson and its progeny because LWOP
109
sentences for juveniles are “akin to the death penalty.” Both LWOP
and capital punishment result in the convicted individual’s death
while in custody of the state. By implication, then, Miller’s
requirement “of individualized sentencing for youth facing life
without parole is, as in the death penalty cases, ‘constitutionally
110
indispensable’ and ‘essential.’” Also, as in the context of capital
punishment, there is an impermissible risk that a juvenile convicted
under a mandatory LWOP scheme is sentenced to “a punishment that
111
the law cannot impose on him.” In Justice Harlan’s opinion, this
very scenario of a person being “subjected to an unjustified
punishment” requires the principle of finality to yield to greater
112
concerns of justice.
113
Montgomery also favorably compares Schriro v. Summerlin,
another Supreme Court case concerning capital punishment that
114
distinguishes between substantive and procedural rules. The Court
in Summerlin set out to determine whether its previous holding—that
a jury, not a judge, was required to find an aggravating circumstance
necessary for imposition of the death penalty—was substantive or
115
procedural. The Court held that it was procedural, because it
regulated “only the manner of determining the defendant’s
116
Such procedural rules do not merit retroactive
culpability.”
application because they “merely raise the possibility that someone
convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been
117
acquitted otherwise.” By contrast, decisions that the Supreme Court
has classified as substantive have altered the range of potential
118
outcomes of the criminal process. Miller in no way regulates the

109. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
110. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 21 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
111. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417
U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
112. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 13 (“[S]ubstantive rules that expand the
available sentences raise a real risk that a person has been subjected to an unjustified
punishment—a situation serious enough to justify reopening final cases.”); Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“This, I believe is because it represents
the clearest instance where finality interests should yield.”).
113. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
114. Id. at 353.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 352.
118. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (narrowing the range of
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“manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Instead, by
giving defendants like Montgomery the chance to obtain a more
favorable outcome than was possible before Miller, Miller alters the
“range of permissible [sentencing] outcomes of the criminal
120
proceeding” and is therefore substantive. The Court in Summerlin
further stated that if a court held that “a certain fact [was] essential to
121
the death penalty,” that holding would be substantive. Montgomery
analogizes such a holding to Miller’s holding that prescribes a
sentencer to consider certain enumerated factors, such as the juvenile
defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation and his home environment,
122
before imposing LWOP.
Montgomery finds both holdings
sufficiently similar to one another, meaning that both must be
123
substantive.
Finally, the Montgomery has mentioned another compelling
reason why the Court should apply Miller retroactively: it already has.
The Court in Miller granted resentencing hearings as relief to two
juveniles serving mandatory LWOP—the petitioner Evan Miller, and
124
Kuntrell Jackson, the petitioner in Miller’s companion case. Miller’s
case was on direct review, while Jackson’s case was on collateral
125
review. Per Teague, “once a new rule is applied to the defendant in
the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be
126
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” Montgomery
is similarly situated to Jackson, as his case is also on collateral

possible outcomes by eliminating capital punishment for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82 (2010) (narrowing the range of possible outcomes by eliminating LWOP sentences for
non-homicide juvenile offenders).
119. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353.
120. See Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application for Authorization to File a
Second or Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 13, Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d
720 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3744) [hereinafter Government’s Response to Petitioner’s
Application].
121. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354.
122. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 22–23 (outlining Miller’s requirements and
comparing them to court precedent about aggravating factors in capital cases, and describing the
substantive nature of each).
123. See id. at 22–23.
124. See id. at 15 n.7 (“Because the new rule announced in Miller was applied to Mr.
Jackson on collateral review, Mr. Montgomery should likewise benefit from this Court’s ruling
in Miller.”).
125. See id. (“This Court’s decision in Miller provided immediate relief to two juveniles,
Evan Miller, petitioner in Miller, and Kuntrell Jackson, the petitioner in Miller’s companion
case, Jackson v. Hobbs, whose case was on collateral review.”).
126. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989).
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review. Because Jackson’s case benefited from the Miller rule on
collateral review, “evenhanded justice” requires that Miller apply
128
retroactively to Montgomery’s case.
IV. ANALYSIS: MILLER APPLIES RETROACTIVELY ON COLLATERAL
REVIEW
The Supreme Court should characterize the Miller v. Alabama rule
as substantive and apply it retroactively to Montgomery’s case. A
decision otherwise would signal that vague and unsubstantiated
concerns about finality trump Montgomery’s essential constitutional
rights. And, at a more basic level, such a decision would defy common
sense. When the Supreme Court deems a punishment
unconstitutional, the simple assumption is that the continued
infliction of it is also unconstitutional. For example, if the Supreme
Court definitively ruled that torture was unconstitutional, should
society continue to torture people just because it had already begun
to do so before the Court outlawed torture? In law, the simple
assumption is not always the correct one. In this case, however, ample
precedent supports the common-sense assumption.
It is true that the language the Court used in Miller—describing
the rule as simply a requirement “that a sentencer follow a certain
129
process” —did not do Montgomery any favors before imposing a
particular sentence. In using a word closely related to “procedure,”
the Court inadvertently left a red herring that has misled Lousiana.
Lousiana’s argument is myopic and formalistic in focusing on the
procedural aspects of the Miller rule while neglecting the substantive
aspects. Indeed, as the United States government has noted, “nothing
in Miller implies that the Court viewed its decision as purely
130
procedural—and its holding makes clear that it is not.”
By
mandating “that new and more favorable potential outcomes be made
available to defendants who previously had faced only” the outcome
of life without parole, Miller articulated an inherently substantive
131
change in the law.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 15 n.7.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012).
Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application, supra note 120, at 15.
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa reached this conclusion in State v.
132
Ragland, holding that Miller applies retroactively. The court in
Ragland conceded that, broadly speaking, Miller “does mandate a new
133
procedure.” The new procedural requirement of a sentencing
hearing, however, “is the result of a substantive change in the law that
134
prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentencing.” By prohibiting
mandatory LWOP, the Court in Miller effectively “require[d] states to
. . . expand the range of permissible punishments for juveniles to
always include one sentencing option that carries the possibility of
135
release.” The Miller rule “is not akin to a procedural rule that simply
requires admission of a class of evidence or changing the factfinder
[sic] from judge to jury. It requires that new sentencing options be
136
available,” which is a substantive requirement.
As Montgomery has consistently argued, this requirement has
enormous implications for juveniles at the sentencing phase in states
that imposed mandatory LWOP before Miller. Still, justice requires
that Miller have enormous implications for those 2,100 individuals
like Montgomery who were sentenced to mandatory LWOP before
Miller as well. To “hold otherwise would allow the state to impose
unconstitutional punishment on some persons but not others,” merely
because individuals like Montgomery had the misfortune of being
137
sentenced before Miller. This would be “an intolerable miscarriage
138
of justice.” Resentencing hearings would utilize judicial resources,
139
but far less than would retrials. States therefore have a less
compelling interest in finality when only the sentence, and not the
140
underlying conviction, is challenged.
Finally, Miller itself illustrates the substantive nature of its holding
by predicting that LWOP sentences will rarely be imposed against
132. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“Miller applies
retroactively.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 89, at 34.
136. Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application, supra note 120, at 15.
137. Hill v. Snyder, Case No. 10-14568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
30, 2013).
138. Id.
139. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 49 (explaining that “a sentencing hearing,
particularly for a juvenile, is more forward-looking,” than a trial and would not require
relitigating events that ocurred far in the past).
140. See Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 152 (2014) (“[T]he strongest justifications for limiting
reconsideration of final convictions are less compelling with respect to final sentences.”).
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juveniles. The Court stated that “given all we have said in Roper,
Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
141
uncommon.” If fact, it is “the rare juvenile offender whose crime
142
reflects irreparable corruption.” Montgomery is not that rare
offender—ample available evidence indicates “his young age and
related characteristics mitigated against a sentence of life without
143
possibility of parole.” Montgomery of course never received an
individualized sentencing hearing at which a sentencing judge or jury
could consider that mitigating evidence or his capacity for
144
rehabilitation. Had he received such a hearing, Montgomery would
likely not be fated to die in prison.
The same can likely be said for the majority of individuals
currently serving LWOP for crimes they committed as children. Most
of these individuals were sentenced under a mandatory scheme where
145
the sentencer was required to issue a LWOP sentence. Had a
sentencer been able to consider mitigating circumstances before
146
“irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” many of those
juveniles could have been eligible for parole. This is particularly true
for those persons sentenced to LWOP following conviction on a
felony murder charge. These individuals received mandatory LWOP
for participating “in a robbery or burglary during which a coparticipant committed murder, without the knowledge or intent of the
147
teen.” A juvenile is typically less culpable in the felony-murder
scenario than in a traditional homicide, so a LWOP sentence seems
148
particularly outsized in the felony-murder context.

141. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
142. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573).
143. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 5–7 (describing Montgomery’s difficult
upbringing, low IQ, and lack of counsel when his confession was allegedly coerced).
144. Id.
145. Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT (March 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf.
146. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
147. Alison Parker, The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the
U.S., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1–2 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf.
148. See id. at 27 (“[F]elony murder . . . is . . . imposed . . . on teens who participated in a
felony such as robbery during which another participant in the crime killed someone without the
child offender having intended the murder to occur and sometimes without even knowing the
other participant was armed.”).
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After Miller, it is harder than ever to justify that Montgomery and
2,100 similarly situated individuals have been condemned to die in
prison, and will never have the opportunity to put forth evidence of
mitigation or rehabilitation. It is even harder to justify this reality
when all future juvenile offenders will not have this misfortune.
Justice Harlan developed the substantive rule exception precisely to
prevent against the “real risk that a person has been subjected to an
149
unjustified punishment.” By applying Miller retroactively, the Court
would put an end to the infliction of many of these unjustified
punishments. Until then, the law will continue to “rest at a point
150
where it ought properly never to repose.”
CONCLUSION
Those who support applying Miller v. Alabama retroactively take
heart in the fact that this is the second time the Court has granted
151
certiorari on a case concerned with the retroactivity of Miller. Many
152
predict that Kennedy will cast the deciding vote. Whichever way the
Court rules, it will likely have implications for questions beyond the
scope of this case, including the constitutionality of the felony-murder
rule, the imposition of discretionary LWOP on juveniles, and the
153
wisdom of trying youth as adults. At the very least, it will bring
greatly needed clarity to the Teague v. Lane doctrine.

149. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 6.
150. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (Harlan, J., concurring).
151. Telephone Interview with Lauren Fine, Co-Founder and Co-Director at the Youth
Sentencing & Reentry Project (Sept. 9, 2015).
152. Id.
153. Id.

